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Review Essay
Althusser and History
Eric Collum
University of Delaware
Bennett, Tony. Outside Literature. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Sprinker, Michael. Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the
Theory ofHistorical Materialism. New York: Verso, 1987.
Though the authors of both these books are sympathetic to the traditional Marxist desire to politicize the aesthetic, they recognize the validity
ofpoststructuralism' s challenge to the base-superstructure model that underwrites so much of Marxist aesthetics. It is their sympathy with this project
that prompts them to offer their respective analyses of the vexed dichotomy
of aesthetics and history. Michael Sprinker wants to keep both terms of this
dichotomy in play and, proposes to renegotiate the space between them so that
the aesthetic is no longer considered merely a superstructural reflection of
the base, history. To this end he argues for an aesthetics that escapes
historical determination and transforms ideology, and yet still remains a
quantifiable part of history insofar as it can be studied formally in the
"material poetic structure" of the work of art. Tony Bennett, on the other
hand, argues that the aesthetic is a "philosophical" concept that has no place
in literary criticism; he suggests that literature should be considered, not as
a "special kind of writing," but as "a historically specific, socially organized and maintained field of textual uses and effects" (142). In the end,
neither author is entirely 'successful in negotiating the difficulties posed by
the dichotomy o f history and the aesthetic. Sprinker is unable to reconcile the
formalism of aesthetics with the historical specificity of the work of art, and
Bennett's reliance on the self-identity of academic institutions throws doubt
on his ability to separate altogether the aesthetic from literary studies. Both
projects, it seems to me, would have benefited from an extensive genealogy
of the aesthetic that would fix, at least provisionally, its history and clarify
its status in literary institutions.
Michael Sprinker acknowledges the bourgeois character of traditional
Marxist aesthetics. He claims that "[c]lassical Marxism shares with bourgeois aesthetics the conviction that in art one attains freedom, and that this
freedom consists, among other things, in the liberation from ideological
determination and historical determinacy" (13). However, unlike "various
post-Marxists" (a category in which we might include Bennett), Sprinker
does not believe that Marxism's complicity with bourgeois aesthetics makes
Marxism irrelevant. Rather, the author suggests, "What is often dismissively
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termed 'bourgeois aesthetics' may well contain the key to a properly
materialist theory of art" (15). Sprinker rightly criticizes the Marxist/
bourgeois aesthetic for its idealism, which encourages its partisans to ignore
the specificity of the work of art, and for its reliance on a model of
"reflection," which fails to account for art's intervention in history, or, in
Jauss's terms, art's "revolutionary character."
Bennett shares Sprinker's dissatisfaction with the reliance of Marxist
aesthetics on reflection. But where Sprinker primarily faults this model for
its subordination of the aesthetic to history, Bennett questions its tendency
to accept "history" as a pre-discursive given and calls attention to the
institutional nature of historical and sociological knowledge. For Bennett,
the object pursued in each discipline (history is studied in history curriculums, literature in literature curriculums, etc.) does not exist, a priori,
outside the institution. Instead, each discipline produces its own object(s) of
knowledge in accordance with different, and apparently separable, rules that
determine what counts as "true" within a given disciplinary domain.
Bennett argues that such a system of knowledge production poses certain
problems for Marxist literary criticism. He claims that though "many of the
concepts which define the Marxist tradition-the concepts of class, of
relations of production and social formation, for example"-are essentially
socio-economic in character, they have been used by critics to master the
literary text, resulting in an unfortunate mingling of two incompatible sets
of assumptions (8). Such attempts at totalization on the part of literary critics,
Marxist and otherwise, have established historical knowledge as the ultimate referent of the literary text, where issues of interpretation of the latter
must finally be determined by history. According to Bennett, however,
literary texts, like historical texts, form part of the archive of an always
provisional past instead of being merely a reflection or representation of a
fixed historical reality. This means that literary critics ranging from Louis
Althusser to Ian Watt who consider history (or sociology) as a "set of real
conditions and relations" to which literature must ultimately refer (42) are
making a fundamental category mistake, using the discursive rules of one
discipline to validate the object of another.
Besides its commitment to history as the real, Marxist literary theory is,
for Bennett at least, incapacitated by yet another institutional category error,
one that leads in the direction of Sprinker's other major complaint against the
Marxist aesthetic, its idealism. According to Bennett, Marxist literary critics
have not only used their ill-gotten socio-economic and historical tenets to
master the literary text, they have also been such poor stewards as to allow
these concepts to "become entangled with aesthetics through the attempt to
construe Marxism as capable of providing an alternative theorization of
literature on the terms established by aesthetic discourse" (8 [my emphasis]), a discourse that Bennett considers essentially "philosophical," rather
than "literary," in character.
Though I remain skeptical of its excision of the aesthetic from literary
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/11
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executed dissection of (especially Marxist) literary critical practice as well
as its thoughtful demystification of the aesthetic which, it will be readily
agreed, has often served to perpetuate classist, racist, and sexist politics.
Throughout, Bennett's main concern is to replace a critical praxis that treats
the literary text as a "special kind of writing" to be deciphered "in terms
of the underlying realities [it] express[es]" (141), with one in which
literature "emerges . . . as a distinctive [though not subordinate] sphere of
social action that is centrally implicated in and imbricated with the constitution and function of political and ideological relations of power and its
contestation" (108). In his attack on literary practice, Bennett manages to
circumvent some of the problems of previous Marxist or post-Marxist
critiques. For instance, he neatly avoids the problems encountered in Terry
Eagleton's somewhat dubious attempt to dismantle "literature" by targeting, not "literature" itself, but the commitment of literary criticism to an
aesthetics that, he claims, leads only to the critical malaise of indeterminacy
(or, as he puts it, "the black-hole effect"))
Though in basic agreement with Bennett's formulation of literature as
"a socially differentiatedfield of textual uses and effects" (which, by now
it is no doubt obvious, owes a great deal to Foucault), I am troubled by his
tendency to overstate the fixity of disciplinary boundaries, the more so
because it authorizes his dismissal of the aesthetic. The problem with
Bennett's formulation is perhaps not so much that there are no boundaries
operating among and between the disciplines-clearly, there are-but that
these boundaries are more vexed than he wants to admit. Despite occasional
acknowledgments of limited interaction between disciplines, he is, finally,
committed to a model in which a given discipline is treated as a homogeneous
entity governed by specific and specifiable rules proper only to itself. Such
a position leads Bennett to oversimplify concepts like the aesthetic which he
treats as if its history were coeval only with that of philosophy. Closer
scrutiny of the various disciplines in which Bennett's critique is invested
would be necessary in order to establish the convergences, the interactions,
the common assumptions, and the outright contradictions that would ultimately delineate the praxis he proposes. And I believe that such a praxis
would also be less apt to dismiss concepts like the aesthetic which have more
complicated institutional histories than. Bennett allows for.
Bennett's formulation of the aesthetic as incompatible with literary
studies is the most salient difference between his Outside Literature and
Michael Sprinker's Imaginary Relations. Where Bennett sees the aesthetic
as a philosophical concept, Sprinker conceives of it as afimmal category that
cuts across disciplinary boundaries, especially those between literature and
philosophy. As a formal category, the aesthetic is at odds, not with literary
criticism, but with history itself. So conceived, this formalist aesthetic
pushes literary analysis away from the specificity of the work of art (hence
Sprinker's criticism of the idealism of Marxist aesthetics) and at the same
time, because it relies on a model of reflection, "forecloses 'the possibility
of grasping the revolutionary character of art' " (96). This opposition of
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formalism and history organizes the central problematic of Imaginary
Relations and brings together a series of readings in which Sprinker explores
the tensions and contradictions inherent in Marxist aesthetics and attempts
to reconcile, under the aegis of the aesthetic, both formalism and materialism.
At first, Sprinker seems to take a skeptical stance toward the aesthetic
as he mounts a series of arguments that deconstruct previous attempts (by
such figures as Ruskin, Henry James, Hopkins and Nietzsche, and R.S.
Crane) to establish the categorical purity of the aesthetic. Though his
discussion of aesthetic theories is by no means exhaustive (indeed, it is
somewhat diffuse), Sprinker's analysis does go some distance towards
demonstrating that the aesthetic, taken as a purely formal category, is
insupportable. His further discussions of Lukacs, Jauss, and Riffaterre
establish the need to balance the formalism of Marxist aesthetics with a
theory of reception powerful enough to account for the apparent interaction
between the work of art and history. Sprinker's commitment to reception
theory is, I believe, unfortunate, because it is complicit with materialist
accounts which represent history as, to use Bennett's phrase, a "set of real
conditions and relations." This materialism leads him to an aesthetics that
privileges the particular work of art and its relation to a social or historical
context over a more general inquiry into the nature of the aesthetic. Sprinker
never quite resolves the tension between this aspect of his project and his
commitment to de Man's notion of the aesthetic as "a mode of cognition."
His adoption, at times, of de Man's more commodious, and I would argue,
more suggestive version of the aesthetic, allows him to make rather broad
claims. He writes, for instance, that "the category of the aesthetic is
intimately involved in the Marxist theory of history at every moment of its
development" (13). Here, instead of being determined by history, the
aesthetic actually determines how history itself is conceptualized within
Marxist theory. Thus, for the de Maniac Sprinker, models of history are
themselves implicated in the aesthetic structures that they seem to account
for.

Where part I of Imaginary Relations challenges the scope of the
aesthetic, part II (entitled "Marxism") offers a more sustained attempt to
work through, on a more theoretical level, the problems endemic to Marxist
accounts of the aesthetic. In this section Sprinker makes his way through the
work of Fredric Jameson, Jean-Paul Sartre and Perry Anderson in order to
prepare a space for the "properly materialist theory of art" suggested in the
first chapter. Such a theory must somehow account for the interaction
between the aesthetic and ideology, and qualitatively differentiate the work
of art from mere ideological representation. After dispensing with these
Marxist theorists Sprinker is finally led to piece together and elaborate on the
occasional aesthetics of Louis Althusser, relying, finally, on what he refers
to as "alienation-effect" to bring together the aesthetic and history. In the
most general terms, this properly aesthetic effect is the mechanism that both
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/11
transforms the "materials of ideologies" that constitute the work of art, and
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produces new ideology, and therefore new subjects, through interaction with
its audience. Sprinker's account of this transformation is inspired by
Althusser's contention that "consciousness does not accede to the real
through its own internal development, but by the radical discovery of what
is other than itself" (quoted 278). If consciousness is structured by ideology,
the unconscious becomes the site of the "other than itself" Transformation,
then, is made possible because the work of art and its audience interact in
such a way that the former becomes the consciousness of the latter and allows
for transformation of ideology and hence for movement outside the closed
ci-cle of ideological-historical determination.
The author's discussion of the "alienation-effect" recalls his earlier
emphasis on the importance of Rezeptionsasthetik. He argues for a twopronged approach to the aesthetic, where the work of art is the object of two
modes of investigation: the one a "science of the history of ideology,"
studies the ways in which works of art are used ideologically to maintain
dominant social relations, the other seeks to understand "scientifically" the
poetic structures of a given work of art. It seems to me that two major
problems haunt this project. The first is one of justification. Sprinker
problematically contends that Marx (and Althusser) argue not for a teleology
of modes ofproduction but for a differentiating of different forms of the same
object, a variation on a theme, so to speak, or elaboration through time. But
this model provides no ground for privileging any "new ideology" produced
by the work of art. By taking the teleology out of Marxism, Sprinker leaves
himselfno means ofjustifying the ideological transformation initiated by the
aesthetic object. And we are left to wonder why this transformation was so
important to begin with. The second problem is that instead of debunking the
nature of the aesthetic, the version of formalism that Sprinker embraces in
the end relegates the aesthetic to the unaccountable processes of the
unconscious and so reinstates the same mystification of the aesthetic that he
admits has plagued Marxist accounts of art all along. In order to secure the
aesthetic, Sprinker must efface it. It seems to me that both these problems
stem from Sprinker's inability to reconcile reception theory with formalism.
Being understandably unwilling to locate the site of the aesthetic solely in a
reader or in a text, Sprinker seems nonetheless to give priority to "the
materiality of the work of art (i.e., its formal properties as a product of
aesthetic practice .)" (272). Partly because of his ultimate abandonment
of a broader vision of the aesthetic, the connection which Sprinker insists
upon between the two categories of formalism and historical determination
remains, finally, largely rhetorical.
Though his discussion of the aesthetic as it pertains to the work of art
falls short of its stated goal (the "clarification of concepts"), Sprinker does
point, in his more de Manian moments, to another more promising arena in
which aesthetic theory might be applied-the problem of how to account for
historical change in general. This problem is eventually framed within a
context that Bennett ultimately rejects, Kant's formulation of the aesthetic
(in Critique ofJudgement), in which the aesthetic mediates between being.

.
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in-the-world (practical Reason) and rational understanding (pure Reason).
While Bennett claims that "theories of the aesthetic logically presuppose an
already elaborated theory of knowledge," it seems to me that Sprinker holds
out the possibility that the reverse might instead (or also) be true. The
possibility, once recognized, of deconstructing this dichotomy suggests a way
out of the materialist dilemma in which Sprinker fmds himself If the
aesthetic is not the product of an epistemology but rather enables epistemological distinctions, then the aesthetic would be implicated in the very
structure of history itself. Pushing this more comprehensive notion of the
aesthetic through a rigorous genealogy might produce a useful map of the
relation between the aesthetic and the disciplines in which it operates.
Unfortunately, Sprinker approaches this insight obliquely and fails to
develop or explore this larger epistemological issue, so that it becomes
difficult to assess his own attitude towards it. But it is nonetheless clear that
Sprinker's materialism does not offer the only venue in which to exploit the
tension between history and the aesthetic.
Ultimately, any analysis that establishes the relation of the aesthetic to
historical change needs to involve a more detailed study of the aesthetic.
Instead of falling back on the "materiality" of the work of art, such a study
would examine the structural necessity of the aesthetic to concepts of history.
Instead of pragmatically excluding the aesthetic as a pure disciplinary
concept, a genealogy of "the aesthetic" might determine its disciplinary
commitments, accidental and otherwise. After all, one need not be a
proponent of a "history of ideas" to suspect that concepts like the aesthetic
have histories that cannot be contained within a single discipline.

Note
1. Like Stephen Heath, Bennett maintains that regardless of how vehemently
Eagleton denounces literature as a category, he is still writing from a position
"inside" the institutional confines of literature-for all Eagleton's efforts,
"literature" will not simply disappear in a puff of logic.
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